2025 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
Second Session (Geneva, 1–5 September 2025)
Asia-Pacific Institute for Law and Security
Thank you, chair! Good afternoon, colleagues!
The Asia-Pacific Institute for Law and Security—APILS—is a specialist organisation that seeks to further national and international law as a means for achieving sustainable regional and international security, including human security. We support and promote responsible practices in the development and use of technology for military and security purposes.
Chair,
We thank you for your continued leadership during the intersessional period, which has led to the revised rolling text that we have before us today. We note the substantive progress that has been made on this text under the current mandate of the GGE. This confirms the wisdom of your approach, Chair, to structuring and organising the work of the Group. The rolling text is a rich document, which provides a good set of building blocks for an instrument.
We appreciate the opportunity to refine the text further and make a few comments on Box I.
Paragraph 1 offers a working characterisation of LAWS for the purposes of these discussions and as an element of an instrument. As we understand it, the intent of this paragraph is twofold. On the one hand, it facilitates our work by setting some boundaries on what we are talking about. On the other hand, it makes it clear that this understanding does not prejudice discussions in other fora, which may well adopt different characterisations.
In our view, the opening words—“within the scope of the application of the CCW”—do not best capture that intent.
The phrase “scope of the application” has a very specific legal meaning under Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, and essentially means “situations of armed conflict”. The phrase is used in the rolling text as a boundary marker in a different sense and for a different purpose.
We therefore suggest replacing the first clause of this paragraph with the words “In the context of the objectives and purposes of the CCW”. This latter phrase comes directly from the mandate of the group. It also has the benefit of firmly anchoring the elements of the instrument in the CCW’s role of prohibiting and restricting the use of weapons that are excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects.
We see merit in the US proposal of bringing the introductory clause of paragraph 1, along with the opening clause of paragraph 2, to the very beginning of Box I. This would make it clear that they apply to all three paragraphs of this Box.
Moving on to the phrase “an integrated combination of one or more weapons and technological components”.
Our colleagues from Article 36 have previously pointed out that the words “integrated combination” could imply that all functions must be performed by a single physical unit. We agree that any risk of such reading should be avoided. In practice, a LAWS are likely to be made up of physically dispersed components, which operate as a system to achieve autonomous functionality. There are existing point-defence systems, for example, which are modular, consisting of physically separate weapons, sensor units and a control unit.
To better reflect the fact that we are dealing with weapon systems, but not necessarily unitary devices, we could perhaps use the phrase “interconnected combination” or “functionally integrated combination”.
We also listened with interest to the proposal of the Russian delegation to add the word “auxiliary” before the words “technological components”. Language of this nature could help clarify the role of those additional technological components, addressing the concerns raised by India.
Finally on paragraph 1, we appreciate the omission of target identification from the list of critical functions of LAWS, which has been supported by many delegations this morning. (We found the arguments offered by the ICRC before lunch especially persuasive.)
Many of the concerns raised in this GGE apply even where a human identifies a set of targets, but the weapon system needs no further human input for detecting these targets, and selecting and engaging one of them. The measures this Group is developing in boxes III and IV of the rolling text would be perfectly relevant to such weapon systems where target identification is performed by a human.
Paragraph 2 seeks to clarify the meaning of lethal for the purposes of paragraph 1. We agree with those delegations that prefer not to limit the elements of the instrument by reference to lethality. These delegations have explained in detail that the lethality of a weapon can depend on its use, and that the existing IHL framework makes no distinction between weapons based on their lethality.
That said, paragraph 2 represents a constructive attempt at a compromise solution. But we find the second sentence slightly confusing. Grammatically, the sentence suggests that it is the “circumstances that [result or] do not result in death”. While circumstances are certainly relevant, the focus should be on the use—the human conduct that IHL regulates.
We would suggest replacing the words “used in circumstances that” with the words “used in a way that”. Also, we agree with Australia that the list of examples of non-lethal harm is unnecessary and could be deleted. With these changes, the second sentence of paragraphs 2 would read: “The fact that a LAWS can be used in a way that does not result in death does not exclude it from this characterization.”
I thank you, Chair!
